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Abstract
Big Data are increasingly used in machine learning in order to create predictive models. How are predictive practices that use 
such models to be situated? In the field of surveillance studies many of its practitioners assert that “governance by discipline” 
has given way to “governance by risk”. The individual is dissolved into his/her constituent data and no longer addressed. I 
argue that, on the contrary, in most of the contexts where predictive modelling is used, it constitutes Foucauldian discipline. 
Compliance to a norm occupies centre stage; suspected deviants are subjected to close attention—as the precursor of possible 
sanctions. The predictive modelling involved uses personal data from both the focal institution and elsewhere (“Polypano-
pticon”). As a result, the individual re-emerges as the focus of scrutiny. Subsequently, small excursions into Foucauldian 
texts discuss his discourses on the creation of the “delinquent”, and on the governmental approach to smallpox epidemics. 
It is shown that his insights only mildly resemble prediction as based on machine learning; several conceptual steps had to 
be taken for modern machine learning to evolve. Finally, the options available to those subjected to predictive disciplining 
are discussed: to what extent can they comply, question, or resist? Through a discussion of the concepts of transparency and 
“gaming the system” I conclude that our predicament is gloomy, in a Kafkaesque fashion.
Keywords Algorithms · Discipline · Foucault · Machine learning · Normation · Panopticon · Prediction · Risk · 
Transparency
Introduction
In our Big Data society, data about persons and their 
behaviours are collected as a matter of routine. This mod-
ern day surveillance—the systematic monitoring of mem-
bers of society—pervades all areas of life, from work and 
communication, to consumption and leisure (Lyon 2003). 
These data are used for purposes of description, pattern 
recognition, playing various games, and the like. Follow-
ing a recent development, they can be used for predictive 
purposes. Based on machine learning (henceforth: ML), 
algorithms are developed that are intended to predict some 
future behaviour of the persons under consideration. The 
outcomes assist the managers and authorities involved in 
taking the best decision. Think of banks granting a loan, 
insurance companies judging customer claims, tax officials 
scrutinizing declarations for possible tax evasion, security 
personnel screening passengers, police officers seeking to 
prevent crime, etc.
In this article, the focus is on these predictive models. 
What is the status of these models as institutions apply 
them? How are their “predictive practices” to be situated? 
In the field of surveillance studies a theoretical trend can 
be observed asserting that “governance by discipline” has 
given way to “governance by risk”. Surveillance practices 
loosen their disciplinary hold on individuals to make way 
for management of group risks. In this article I take aim at 
this contention. I argue that the claim is overblown, and that 
predictive practices in particular still constitute governance 
by discipline in a wide range of contexts. For this purpose, 
I take recourse to several texts by Michel Foucault. To his 
Discipline and Punish, obviously, his seminal work on dis-
cipline; but also to some of his lectures at the Collège de 
France. In doing so, I just take out of the Foucauldian tool 
box the tools that suit me—an approach justly advocated by 
Kevin Haggerty (2006). In the end, after having made my 
case for prediction as Foucauldian disciplining, I ask myself 
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what possibilities remain for subjects involved to comply, 
question, or resist such modelling and their outcomes? What 
modes of individual or collective resistance are possible? I 
argue that our predicament is Kafkaesque, without much 
prospect of improvement in the near future.
Before commencing the discussion proper, I put some 
building blocks in place. For one thing, some explications 
of ML, the basic technique underlying prediction, are in 
order. For another, I devote a section to Discipline and Pun-
ish, the “Urtext” as far as societal disciplining is concerned. 
Thereafter, I come to the core of this article: are predictions 
enlisted for purposes of governance by discipline or by risk?
Machine learning
First a few words about predictive models based on ML 
(what follows is based on de Laat 2018). Techniques 
employed by ML are classification and decision trees, sup-
port vector machines, ensemble methods, neural networks, 
and the like. In inductive fashion an appropriate model is 
constructed that best fits the data (“training set”). Based 
on these data, the model is trained step by step, its predic-
tion error ever diminishing. This error is usually expressed 
through the measures of “precision” (the number of true 
positives as a fraction of all predicted positives) and “recall” 
(the number of true positives as a fraction of all positives in 
the training set)—often combined into the F-measure.1 In 
general, the numbers of false positives and false negatives 
are inversely related: one cannot decrease any one of them 
without increasing another one.
In the process of modelling, a dominant concern is “over-
fitting”: one goes on and on to train (say) the classifier until 
the very end. The end product surely fits the training data—
but only those; it is unfit to be generalized to other, new 
data. One recipe against overfitting (amongst many) is to 
divide the training data into a training set (80%) and a test 
set (20%). The classifier is trained on the former set, its error 
diminishing with every iteration. Simultaneously, one keeps 
an eye on the classifier’s error as applied to the other test 
set. When the latter error starts to increase, it is time to stop 
and be satisfied with the classifier a few steps back (“early 
stopping”).
A further problem that needs to be taken into account is 
the “class imbalance problem”. In many areas, the “class 
variables” of the “target variable” (i.e., the subcategories 
of the main variable to be predicted) are represented very 
unequally in the population. Think of transactions that 
amount to monetary fraud, or tax evasion—these only make 
up a tiny fraction of all transactions. Or think of the fraction 
of ill-intentioned plane passengers amongst all passen-
gers. Training on such an imbalanced dataset may produce 
a model that overfits to the majority of data representing 
bona-fide transactions. The main approach is to adjust the 
available training set in order to obtain a more balanced set. 
Either one deletes data points from the overrepresented class 
(“undersampling”), or adds data points from the underrep-
resented class (“oversampling”).
Note, finally, that the algorithmic end-products of ML are 
often difficult to interpret, even by experts. The algorithms 
yield accurate outcomes, but an explanation in understand-
able terms of why a specific decision is recommended can-
not be supplied. The model is effectively a black box for all 
of us, laymen and experts alike. This is called the problem 
of “interpretability” or “explainability”.
Discipline and Punish
Before tackling the issue whether Foucauldian discipline 
has withered or not, let me briefly rehearse some arguments 
as developed by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish 
(1977; French original 1975). He analysed the development 
of the prison regime from the seventeenth century onwards. 
Discipline enters the prisons, and subsequently the army, 
schools, hospitals, and factories. Their subjects are variably 
disciplined by means of a division of tasks, regulations, 
time-tables, exercises, inspections, examinations, and the 
like. Furthermore, sanctions and rewards become part and 
parcel of the disciplinary regime. Foucault stresses that these 
modalities of power did not overturn the institutions, but 
just crept into and strengthened them (Foucault 1977, pp. 
215, 216).
The disciplinary gaze is exercised along the panoptic 
principle (Foucault 1977, pp. 195–230): one is always in 
full light and visible, and must assume one is watched all 
the time. The archetypical design for prisons along this 
principle had been sketched by Bentham: the Panopticon. A 
central guard can observe all the inmates all the time; these 
can neither see each other nor whether the guard is actually 
observing them. One must be careful though not to equate 
the panoptic design with Bentham’s specific proposal: the 
principle can have many other applications, in other guises, 
in hospitals, schools, and factories. Panopticism is a utopian 
idea; ‘in fact a figure of political technology that may and 
must be detached from any specific use’ (Foucault 1977, p. 
205).
All the observations gathered serve a purpose: classi-
fying the subjects on a homogeneous scale (or on a num-
ber of them). The observance of rules and regulations, the 
results of examinations and exercises, the displayed moral-
ity of behaviour: all of this can be taken into account. The 
scale not only describes; it normalizes at the same time. 1 F = 2 (precision × recall)/(precision + recall).
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In Discipline and Punish this process of normation has the 
following meaning. All subjects involved are drawn into a 
comparative field which, by its very existence, exerts a pres-
sure to conform. The scale is constructed ‘to function as a 
minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an 
optimum towards which one must move’ (Foucault 1977, p. 
183). As Foucault summarizes the process: the scale ‘com-
pares, differentiates, hierarchies, homogenizes, excludes. In 
short, it normalizes’ [italics in original] (Foucault 1977, p. 
183). This normalizing power had invaded all the institutions 
that he examined.
From discipline to risk?
It is this model of panoptic discipline that is declared to 
be outdated by many scholars in current surveillance stud-
ies. Consider David Lyon, a prominent scholar in the field. 
According to him, the metaphors of Big Brother and the 
Panopticon have become ‘less relevant’ (Lyon 2003, p. 19). 
In some ways, modern day surveillance can be interpreted as 
‘positive and beneficial, permitting new levels of efficiency, 
productivity, convenience, and comfort’ (Lyon 2003, p. 19). 
This is achieved by the creation of profiles and risk catego-
ries. These are the basis for a process of “social sorting”: 
‘classifying people and populations according to varying 
criteria, to determine who should be targeted for special 
treatment, suspicion, eligibility, inclusion, access, and so 
on’ (Lyon 2003, p. 20). Such sorting thus affects people’s 
lifestyle choices and life-chances. This topos of “social sort-
ing” as expressed by Lyon is still very much alive; cf. for 
example Erwin (2015, pp. 41, 42) who, in a discussion of 
post-modern “smart surveillance”, argues along the very 
same lines. Note, though, that in a later anthology Lyon 
seems to retract from this position and blow new life into 
the panoptic metaphor: ‘The Panopticon refuses to go away’, 
and ‘the idea of the Panopticon still appears routinely in 
surveillance discourses’ (Lyon 2006, p. 4).
So, with (the earlier) Lyon we see classical discipline 
moving into the background, broader governance taking 
over, and associated with this, a shift of focus from the indi-
vidual to the group. Such theoretical tendencies are even 
more pronounced with other leading scholars of surveil-
lance, most of them having affinities with the French philo-
sophical tradition. Let me treat some of them.
Early on, Mariana Valverde and Michael Mopas, work-
ing in the field of “critical” criminology, already signalled a 
shift from governance by discipline to governance by risk. 
In former days, they argue, discipline governed individuals 
on an individual basis (à la Foucault). Nowadays, the indi-
vidual is broken up into measurable risk factors (Valverde 
and Mopas 2004, p. 240). Henceforth governance targets 
groups identified as high risk in appropriate ways (“targeted 
governance”). The emphasis on risk groups implies that no 
efforts are taken any longer to separate the deviant from the 
normal, the criminal from the honest citizen (Valverde and 
Mopas 2004, p. 243).
Louise Amoore, also occupied with problems of security, 
subscribes to this analysis. ML is based on an ontology of 
association between disparate data (Amoore 2011, p. 27). 
These are obtained by dissolving the individual into his/her 
data as deemed appropriate. From the exercise a risk score 
or flag is derived for each individual (Amoore 2011, p. 25). 
This data derivative ‘is not centred on who we are, nor even 
on what our data says about us, but on what can be imagined 
and inferred about who we might be (…)’ (Amoore 2011, 
p. 28). Thus, the future is drawn into the present and action 
can be taken—the data have become “actionable” (Amoore 
2011, p. 29). Predictive algorithms hold the promise that 
henceforth, risks can be managed ahead of time (Amoore 
2013, p. 9).
With Antoinette Rouvroy, the disappearance of the indi-
vidual becomes ever more pronounced. Regulation by law 
is gradually replaced by regulation by algorithms. Such 
algorithmic governance no longer addresses the subject as 
a moral agent (Rouvroy 2012, p. 11). Instead, it dissolves the 
individual into a bundle of data, needed for the production of 
appropriate profiles (“data behaviourism”). Embodied indi-
viduals are ignored; only the conditions of their environ-
ment are adapted in accordance with algorithmic outcomes 
(Rouvroy 2012, p. 11). Again, as with Valverde, Mopas, and 
Amoore, the management of risks and opportunities takes 
centre stage.
Of course, the aforementioned authors are all tributary 
to Gilles Deleuze, especially to his “post-scriptum” about 
the societies of control (Deleuze 1992; original in French 
1990). In this short but provocative (as well as wide ranging 
and speculative) essay he announces the decay of the dis-
ciplinary society and the coming of the society of control. 
Closed disciplinary spaces are replaced by the open spaces 
(networks) of the control society. Fixed moulds make way 
for modulating spaces; society’s members are constantly cir-
culating. In such a society, individuals are no longer impor-
tant; they are henceforth reduced to mere “dividuals”, avail-
able for being divided into their constituent data. These data 
are processed by computers, which only know the logic of 
samples, categories, and markets.
Prediction as Foucauldian discipline
The basic tenet that runs through all these accounts is, that 
disciplining has receded into the background and people are 
no longer addressed as individuals (which discipline and law 
have always done). Governance by disciplining individuals 
has given way to governance by managing the risks that 
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specific groups represent. Predictive modelling is considered 
to be the pinnacle of this trend. While some elements of this 
theorizing may have validity, I think that basically these the-
ories lean on outdated conceptions of what profiling stands 
for. At the present day, the individual has re-emerged as the 
focus of attention. Governance by group risk is still adhered 
to (for example, in police circles), but governance by indi-
vidualized risk is coming to the fore. Focusing on the indi-
vidual marks its re-entry from the shadows it was deemed 
to have been relegated to. And let us not be mistaken: such 
“attention” is nothing other than a disciplinary gaze.
I begin my argumentation with a short overview of the 
societal sectors where predictive modelling is being used—
which, obviously, is just meant to be indicative of which 
sectors are involved, not exhaustive or representative in 
any statistical sense. This is a broad spectrum, from pri-
vate to public organizations. It is in the private sector that 
data mining took its first steps long ago. Companies per-
form extensive data collection and modelling, in order to 
sort their customers into various categories; subsequently, 
these can be targeted in optimal fashion (“data base market-
ing”). Soon enough other organizations followed suit. Banks, 
insurance companies, and tax departments rely on profiling 
extensively, in order to deal with financial malperformance 
or outright fraud. Moreover, security forces in general (such 
as the police, border and airport officials) use it par excel-
lence to combat crime, public disturbances, terrorism and 
the like. Local authorities, for their part, have more recently 
initiated innovative prediction efforts in order to curb youth 
crime, child abuse and domestic violence, and fraud with 
social security benefits or local taxes. Finally, we must not 
forget the classical sectors as analysed by Foucault (some 
public, some private): prisons, the army, schools, hospitals, 
and factories. Recently, predictive modelling has been gain-
ing a foothold in those sectors as well. Take education: some 
schools engage in predicting the future performance of their 
teachers, while local authorities take to prediction in order 
to estimate and curb pupil drop-out.
Let me, for an empirical overview of predictive prac-
tices, refer the reader to a recent report by AlgorithmWatch, 
a German watchdog organization. Covering 12 European 
countries, they document the discussions, regulatory pro-
posals, and oversight mechanisms pertaining to algorithmic 
decision-making, as well as the systems of the kind actually 
in use in both private and public organizations (Algorithm-
Watch 2019). For our purposes, their sections about algorith-
mic decision-making in action—which is a more technical 
term for what I refer to as predictive practices—are instruc-
tive, since the rapporteurs focus explicitly on ‘systems that 
affect justice, equality, participation, and public welfare’ 
(AlgorithmWatch 2019, p. 9). That focus is quite in line 
with the focus of my research.
As can be glanced from this overview, many of the insti-
tutions that rely on prediction are characterized by relations 
of power. Principals lord it over their agents, resorting to dis-
ciplining in case of malfunctioning. Otherwise, dependen-
cies are involved which carry obligations that have to be met. 
Or agents wield power in the name of state or local authori-
ties. Thus always a normative order of a kind reigns—rules 
and standards of behaviour have to be met. The exception 
to this rule is data base marketing in the corporate sector: 
the efforts to nudge or win over customers are inspired by 
norms, but these are not dictated to clients as an absolute 
command. The same goes for some prediction-based cam-
paigns by governmental agencies that deserve the epithet 
“paternalistic” (say, to convince people to quit smoking or 
collect rent subsidies they are entitled to).
So this is my first rejoinder to the theories explicated 
above. Profiling leads to social sorting, indeed. But more 
often than not such sorting categories are the expression of 
an underlying normative order. Appearing to deviate from 
it in the (near) future leads to close attention—its form 
depending on the specific context. Once individuals emerge 
from ML as suspects, they are seen as likely to transgress the 
normative order. Accordingly, they may obtain a loan from 
credit agencies on restrictive conditions only, are taken out 
of the queue for questioning by airport officials, are placed 
under increased police supervision, and so on. This close 
attention is a precursor of possible sanctions. In some cases, 
though, the individual is considered too big a risk already; 
then the suspicion alone is reason enough to issue a sanction 
immediately: the loan is refused, the plane passenger is sent 
home straight away, the prisoner is not released on parole, 
and the like.
Already, we see emerging one of the central elements of a 
Foucauldian regime: normation. ML does not create suspect 
categories as is often maintained. Instead, the exercise takes 
as its starting point an apt “target variable” that is supplied 
by the institution. In the institutional contexts we are dealing 
with here, those are the subjectivities that are the focus of 
scrutiny for the personnel involved: the good (or bad) credit 
risk, the model plane passenger, the obliging worker, etc. 
In case of airline passengers, the construction of the binary 
scale is rather easy: does the passenger intend to blow up 
the airplane or not? But it can also be hard work—often 
referred to as the “art” of data mining—to construct a tar-
get variable that adequately expresses the concerns of the 
institution involved. A standard example is creditworthiness: 
what is to count as such? In the past banks have had tough 
discussions on how to operationalize the concept and divide 
it into adequate class variables (Barocas and Selbst 2016, 
pp. 678–680).
The ML effort then starts to work on the basis of this 
particular target variable (so called “supervised learning”). 
Data are used to train models; the data used are referred to 
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as “training data”. These should contain enough data points 
of all categories of the target variable (“class variables”)—
otherwise the exercise is futile. The aim is to create a model 
that separates the class variables from each other. Referring 
to the examples above: separating the good credit risks from 
the bad ones, the terrorist passengers from those who have 
no such intentions, and so on. The model is geared to sepa-
rate the deviants from the conformers.
But where do these data come from? Obviously, the insti-
tutions involved collect data about their subjects or clients, 
as they already did long before the era of Big Data began. 
But nowadays additional datasets are procured from out-
side. Data are collected from everywhere, with every step we 
take (especially on the Internet) we create a digital footprint. 
Our behaviour in other institutions, our search and shopping 
behaviour, our social media presence, all gets recorded. Data 
that sometimes have to be provided, sometimes have been 
provided voluntarily. In the latter case, we are not even aware 
that such data are being stored. Now, all such acquired data-
sets are routinely exchanged between institutions (without 
much regard for the law) (cf. Wigan and Clarke 2013). Data-
brokers even make a living from the practice. So modern 
ML operates on an elaborate pool of datasets that have been 
gathered in a variety of contexts.
Can this be interpreted using the metaphor of the Pano-
pticon? I think this is indeed the case, in a double sense. 
As far as the “focal” institution is concerned, its subjects 
must assume that relevant data are generated and collected 
all the time—a routine Panopticon. But in addition, they 
must assume that in many other Panoptica in which they are 
entangled, other digital traces about them are monitored and 
stored. Subsequently these data may be imported backwards 
into the focal institution that we are considering. All such 
imports boost ML efforts considerably, often in surprising 
ways. Thus the panoptic gazes of many different contexts 
are coupled together: a “Polypanopticon”. Many hitherto 
separated domains of life become intertwined.
Two comparisons suggest themselves. For one thing, pre-
dictive practices are executed in a true “surveillant assem-
blage”—the convergence of once discrete surveillance sys-
tems (a term coined by Haggerty and Ericson 2000). For 
another, concerning the plurality of datasets involved, note 
the parallel with the metaphoric concept of “rhizomatic” 
growth, as coined by Deleuze long ago (cf. discussion in 
Haggerty and Ericson 2000). You may uproot one plant 
(read: dataset), but the damage is already done, the roots 
have branched underground (read: multiplied) so that other 
exemplars of the plant will emerge in abundance (or already 
have). Once a dataset has been created, its multiplication is 
unstoppable.
The importance of this data coupling relates directly to 
the character of ML. Predictive modelling can only ben-
efit from bringing in as many datasets as possible about the 
persons involved. The more variety in independent vari-
ables the better the outcomes (though with a caveat: experts 
warn that extra datasets can also import a lot of noise that 
effectively supresses the signal one is looking for). As has 
been described above, ML has no conception of causality—
all data are taken as input. As a result, surprising correla-
tions may be produced. Compare the terrorists-to-be who 
are halted for inspection—because they paid in cash and/or 
carried no luggage; or the tax payers whose tax declarations 
are selected for auditing—because they contributed a lot of 
money to charity. Thus, precisely this abundant coupling of 
far-away datasets about individuals may boost the results 
of ML.
So taken together, predictive modelling may be inter-
preted as a case of Foucauldian discipline, though with a 
twist. As far as normation is concerned, prediction repre-
sents an additional mechanism which extends a normation 
already in existence. Compliance to the norm is measured in 
in enhanced predictive fashion which subsumes the classical 
way of measuring. As far as the data are concerned, these are 
procured by both the focal institution and by other contexts 
(the “Polypanopticon”). An institution can glance sideways 
as it were, and peer into the data pools of other institutions. 
The discipline of ML thus strengthens existing relations of 
power by harnessing the predictive power of Big Data. Just 
as Foucauldian discipline gradually crept into the various 
institutions and strengthened their modalities of power a few 
centuries ago, so do predictive practices at the present day.
Note the curious conception of time and timing of this 
strengthened discipline. Primary discipline is put into 
action as soon as a subject breaks—or appears to be about 
to break—the norm; the secondary mechanism of discipline 
based on prediction as an outcome of ML may suggest an 
intervention even before that: as soon as a subject appears 
likely to be breaking a norm sometime in the future. The 
former discipline had to wait until norm deviance happens 
or seems immanent; the latter anticipates it and acts accord-
ingly. In the case of burglary: wait until the break-in actu-
ally happens, or appears to be about to happen (primary 
discipline), or in anticipation put the suspect under close 
surveillance (secondary discipline).
For the decision subjects this extended disciplining has 
grave consequences (to which I come back more fully later). 
Algorithmic decision-making changes the way in which 
organizations approach their subjects. In a nutshell: with pri-
mary disciplining a decision was based on causally related 
variables or reputational indicators. Moreover, a decision 
could in principle be explained to the decision subject. Con-
sequently, they could try to adapt their ‘parameters’ in order 
to do better. As well, the subject could contest a decision in 
case of a disagreement. Secondary disciplining changes all 
that: decisions are based on any number of associated vari-
ables as long as they add to the accuracy of the algorithm. 
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Further, they cannot be explained in any way since algo-
rithms are (usually) opaque. As a result, the subject has no 
way of understanding a decision, and, as a corollary, cannot 
contest it—grounds for decisions are simply lacking.
Individualized risk
Are ML models geared to governance by risk? Are indi-
viduals reduced to risk categories that have to be managed? 
I think this conception referred to above has become out-
dated. In former days ML indeed produced so-called profiles 
of high-risk deviants. As soon as individual characteristics 
matched such a profile, they were considered to represent 
high risk. Such profiles steered the interventions of corpora-
tions (such as insurance companies and banks) and public 
bodies (such as security forces).
Nowadays most ML models no longer have profiles as 
their output. Profiles are a special kind of decision tree (one-
sided) that is interpretable. But decision trees and classifica-
tions in general do not have easily interpretable outcomes in 
terms of the underlying variables. Nor do neural networks 
allow any such explanation. The models have effectively 
become black boxes. But on the plus side, they yield more 
precise outcomes; and the predictive probabilities of being a 
deviant are tailored to each individual. So governance nowa-
days has receded from governing risk groups; governance by 
individualized risk has taken over.
Critics might object that the subject is still not addressed 
as such, but as the risk (s)he represents. But that has always 
been the case in the contexts we are considering here: the 
bank or the police were always on the lookout for suspicious 
signs that might indicate someone was out of line. ML just 
produces a new—more powerful—indicator of suspicion 
that is added to the repertoire of the authorities concerned.
Is the individual just dissolved into his/her constituent 
data—never to emerge again? On the contrary, I would 
say. Data about individuals are used in two different ways. 
For one thing, a set of them are used for training purposes. 
These should be data that are reliable and vetted; especially 
concerning the target variable—otherwise the ML effort 
is useless. In a way, these “divided” individuals have ful-
filled their purpose and will not reappear. For another, once 
a model has been produced it stands ready for predictive 
purposes. That is, new individuals who appear on the scene 
for consideration are subdivided (again) and their data fed 
into the algorithm. As output, say, a risk score appears. That 
score is influential in the decision-making of the institu-
tion about that individual. It will be a decision specifically 
geared to that individual—instead of disappearing, he/she 
has resurfaced.
Another contention referred to above was, that govern-
ance by risk is no longer interested in drawing the line 
between normal/abnormal people. This is a curious asser-
tion that completely disregards what is at stake with ML. 
The starting point is always an adequately defined “target 
variable”. If it is a binary one, the variable reads good 
credit risk/bad credit risk; terrorist inclinations no/yes; or 
more generally: normal/abnormal. The modelling then sets 
out to draw the best line between the normal ones and the 
abnormal ones, to sort the normal from the abnormal train-
ing instances. So predictive modelling is precisely geared 
towards separating normal and deviant people—that is what 
the exercise is all about. And note: in the old days of profil-
ing, as well, such a separation was always the ultimate goal.
Matzner’s performance view on data
This Foucauldian view on Big Data and discipline is 
actually quite close to the view of Tobias Matzner, who 
recently published several articles about Big Data. He 
explicitly chooses to narrow down the usual (broad) defi-
nition of surveillance to data gathering in contexts of dis-
cerning “suspects” (Matzner 2016, p. 200), roughly those 
of security and police. With that kind of surveillance, he 
writes, ‘subjectivizing moments happen’ (Matzner 2017, 
p. 31). In particular, data are used to identify ‘suspects’ 
and discipline them if necessary (Matzner 2017, p. 44). 
Properly speaking, they are established as “criminals 
before the act” (a hint to Foucault that I come back to 
later; Matzner 2017, p. 39ff.) He develops this Foucauldian 
view as a counterpoint to the views of Amoore, Rouvroy, 
and others.
Nevertheless, I have some minor points of criticism of 
his stance. For one thing, he advocates a “performance 
view” on data (as opposed to the usual “representationalist 
view” of data: how accurate are the data?) (Matzner 2016). 
However, as is clear from my description of ML, it is not 
data that perform but the algorithms that are produced 
from them. The neural networks and decision trees create 
the suspect, not the data. And depending on how well the 
algorithms are crafted, they may perform quite differently. 
In line with this, we talk about governance by algorithm; 
no one has ever coined the term governance by data.
For another, the creation of suspects also happens in 
other contexts than security alone. Compare above: sus-
picions of tax fraud, insurance fraud, money launder-
ing, etc. A plurality of suspects can be created. Finally, 
in Matzner’s work (especially Matzner 2017) he often 
refers to the phrase: creation of subjectivities. As well, 
he speaks about norms that are derived from data. This 
creates the impression that such subjectivities turn up as 
an outcome of data processing—there were none before. 
But as elucidated above, ML (at least supervised learning) 
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always starts from a particular subjectivity salient to the 
institution. ML methods then aim to develop an algorithm 
that reproduces this (primary) normation with the highest 
possible accuracy.
Foucault: prescient about prediction?
Many an author in the surveillance literature I referred to 
(Amoore and Matzner in particular) alludes to specific sec-
tions in Foucauldian texts that are interpreted as precursors 
of the procedure of prediction which is executed by ML. It 
seems worthwhile to bring up these passages here. Not for 
the sake of a discussion of what Foucault had or had not 
foreseen, writing in the period around the 1970s before the 
age of Big Data dawned. These texts can help, though, to 
clarify what modern predictive methods have achieved com-
pared to the tools of the past. In comparison, I would argue, 
they embody conceptual steps that are by no means trivial.
The first reference to be treated here is a section of Dis-
cipline and Punish, in which Foucault gives an account of 
the changes in the French penitentiary system during the 
nineteenth century: the “delinquent” substitutes for the 
“criminal” (Foucault 1977, pp. 251–254). Once the convict 
enters the prison, his criminal act is no longer important, 
but his life is. The causes of his crime are to be found in a 
biographical investigation, which delves into ‘psychology, 
social position and upbringing’ (Foucault 1977, p. 252). 
Thus ‘it establishes the “criminal” as existing before the 
crime and even outside it’ (Foucault 1977, p. 252) (in the 
French original: ‘Il fait exister le “criminel” avant le crime 
et, dans la limite, en dehors de lui’; Foucault 1975, pp. 255, 
256). A whole typology of delinquents was being developed; 
each type had to be treated by a specific prison regime. Thus, 
the penitentiary system took over from the juridical system. 
In the new system, the delinquent is to be observed perma-
nently. Do the correctional measures succeed in reforming 
them?
Actually, around the same time that Foucault wrote Dis-
cipline and Punish, he delivered a series of lectures at the 
Collège de France called Abnormal (Foucault 2003). In the 
lecture of 8 January 1975 this theme of the “delinquent” was 
rendered even more forcefully (Foucault 2003, pp. 16–25). 
In particular, the role of psychiatric experts obtained more 
emphasis. On the court’s request they seek to explain how 
the crime has come about, assuming that the suspect did 
indeed commit it (my italics) (Foucault 2003, p. 17). Thus 
they create a ‘psychologico-ethical double of the offense’ 
(Foucault 2003, p. 16). Then, when the judge has to pass 
judgment on the suspect, (s)he will not do so on the basis 
of the crime committed, but of the forms of deviant conduct 
that are the substance of the constructed double. The aim 
of such expert opinion is, remarks Foucault again,’ to show 
how the individual already resembles his crime before he 
has committed it’ (Foucault 2003, p. 19). Subsequently, the 
delinquent becomes ‘the object of a technology and knowl-
edge of rectification, readaptation, reinsertion, and correc-
tion’ (Foucault 2003, p. 21). So the psychiatrist becomes a 
psychiatrist-judge (Foucault 2003, p. 23), greatly influencing 
the question of guilt and the ensuing follow-up measures of 
correction.
Both Amoore, citing Abnormal (Amoore 2013, p. 49), 
and Matzner, citing Discipline and Punish (Matzner 2017, 
pp. 38, 39), refer to passages of this kind. They are struck 
especially by the—indeed striking—phrase that ‘the indi-
vidual already resembles his crime before he has commit-
ted it’. They interpret Foucault’s assertions as follows. The 
experts were actually involved in finding the biographical 
traits that caused the crime to occur. In the process they used 
the (primitive) theories of social conduct that were begin-
ning to evolve at that time. From that point onwards, it is 
‘a rather small step’ (says Matzner 2017, p. 40) to reverse 
the time arrow and initiate the process of predicting such 
crimes; the essence of modern-day surveillance systems. Of 
course, modern approaches seem to lie around the corner. 
But the differences between the prediction associated with 
delinquency and modern-day ML are considerable; several 
conceptual steps have to be taken in between.
For one thing, theories of social and psychological cau-
sation were more primitive. But apart from that, Foucault’s 
experts were reasoning backwards, on the assumption that 
the accused was guilty; then it is always easy to find contrib-
uting factors. And as Foucault forcefully remarks (Foucault 
2003, pp. 22, 23): in case of doubt, those with a monstrous 
personality were most usually considered the guilty ones. 
So much for deriving guilt from the accused’s past. More 
daunting is the task in reverse: predicting who is guilty based 
on a set of biographies. Moreover, the experts in Foucault’s 
court room reasoned with theories characterized by causa-
tion—which factors caused the crime to occur? Modern 
day ML goes beyond causation: all variables pertaining to 
individuals are potentially taken into consideration, ML is 
associational.
Finally, modelling by ML tries to separate the guilty from 
the innocent. To that effect ML needs verified data for train-
ing about the guilty and the innocent. Biographies of both 
categories are needed. A vexing problem usually presents 
itself: data about the former are rarer than data about the 
latter (class imbalance problem). That problem then has to 
be remedied before modelling starts (mainly by under- or 
oversampling, see above).
Another passage from Foucault, this time from his 1978 
lectures (Foucault 2007), also deserves consideration. Work-
ing on a perceived shift in governance from the individual 
to the group, the population, in lecture 3 of 25 January 1978 
he engages in a discussion of the governmental approach 
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to small pox epidemics in the eighteenth century (Foucault 
2007, pp. 85–91). In that approach, Foucault observes, the 
usual process of normation (in which a norm is established 
and subsequently enforced by disciplining the individual) 
is no longer at work. Instead, Foucault argues, we witness a 
more complicated approach that he dubs normalization. Data 
are collected about the incidence of the disease amongst dif-
ferent subpopulations (older vs. younger people, a particular 
milieu or profession, town vs. countryside, etc.). These are, 
say, normal distributions, each with their own mean value. 
From such data one may derive which populations are most 
at risk. In this case of smallpox that Foucault is discussing: 
new-born children were found to be especially vulnerable 
(a chance of 2 in 3 of catching it). Targeted intervention 
then strives to bring this highest mean back in line with the 
overall mean (for smallpox: 1 in 8). The intervention consists 
of inoculation.
Matzner uses this passage to emphasize how “data-
driven” surveillance already was (Matzner 2017, pp. 37, 38). 
I highlight the passage for quite another reason: it shows 
the way, so to speak, to governance by risk, away from indi-
vidual disciplining. Society’s scarce resources are best spent 
with a cool-headed risk approach—instead of wanting to 
cure everybody. Compare the earlier approach to smallpox 
(as described by Foucault): isolate the sick from the healthy 
and subsequently try to cure them all. I presume that the 
theorists mentioned in the above have taken their lead from 
these preoccupations of Foucault when they coined their 
theories about the (supposed) shift from governance by dis-
cipline to governance by risk.
But again, this “normalization” approach is unlike the 
modern day ML-based prediction—although it comes much 
closer than the preceding approach of medical experts in 
the courtroom. Using statistical techniques it can identify 
high-risk groups, allowing targeted governance. In a way, 
a profile is established of the high-risk patients. With ML, 
in comparison, the procedure of generating a model from 
training data is quite specific, and completely different from 
classical statistics methods. Moreover, ML takes all associa-
tions into account, not only the causal ones. As a corollary, 
it can identify all kinds of groups, both “natural” groups 
and groups artificially created for the purpose. Finally, ML 
delivers tailored scores for each individual.
Individual resistance
So modern day prediction as executed by ML again centres 
on the individual. It has evolved into a truly disciplinary 
apparatus. Foucauldian discipline was supposed to exercise 
a self-disciplining force on the inmates. What about the 
reactions of those subjected to predictive discipline: do they 
comply, negotiate, or resist (cf. Lyon 2003, p. 20)? What are 
their options? And does by any chance resistance in organ-
ized fashion arise?
Many of those subjected to predictive modelling will not 
be aware of it. Only when a decision affects them, based on 
one model or another, might awareness arise. Most prob-
ably they will ask for an explanation of how the decision 
came about. Unfortunately, such an explanation is hardly 
ever given. And when details are provided, they tend to be 
uninformative. Legal clauses to that effect are in operation, 
but have little effect (cf. Zarsky 2013, p. 1510ff., p. 1523ff. 
for the American situation). So basically, all details about 
decision-making based on predictive algorithms remain 
opaque.
This darkness is exacerbated if one starts thinking about 
what kind of personal data have entered into the equation. 
Obviously, data about one’s relation to the institution con-
cerned (such as the bank, police, or airport security) may 
be involved. Apart from these data that have been handed 
over consciously, however, transactional data about one on 
the Internet may be involved as well. One leaves electronic 
footprints everywhere. Usually one does not think about this 
for a second, let alone about the possible consequences for 
predictive modelling. Daniel Susser (2016, pp. 224, 225)—
employing a notion developed by Erving Goffman—refers 
to this information as “given off,” as opposed to the usual 
information being given.
Now this predicament—an algorithmic decision without 
explanation and hardly a clue about the kind of data that 
have been fed into the modelling—can properly be described 
as a Kafkaesque situation (Susser 2016, pp. 231, 232, bor-
rowing the insight from Solove). One is a suspect, but what 
is the charge? The answer will not come. The disciplining 
involved is diffuse. In Foucauldian discipline, which very 
much centred on the body, it was abundantly clear why you 
failed and what you should do next in order to succeed—
compare a soldier who failed a shooting exercise and knew 
immediately that he was supposed to do it once more. With 
predictive disciplining, centred on the mind, you only know 
that you have apparently already been failing—but why and 
how to do better is in the dark.
The only thing left is to use your imagination and make 
a list of all the kinds of possibly suspicious behaviours that 
may have been picked up by the modelling. Do you want a 
loan? Avoid the use of a credit card, and do not go to the 
casino. Do you want to take the airplane? Do not buy the 
ticket with cash, and do not only buy a one-way ticket. Do 
you want to overhaul your garden? Do not order large quan-
tities of fertilizer over the Internet. So ultimately one goes 
into a mode of self-censorship, fuelled only by one’s imagi-
nation, in order to avoid supposedly suspicious indicators 
and thereby escape intensified scrutiny by the institutions 
involved. Our lives are forced into conformity.
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Organized resistance
Organized resistance potentially offers some respite from 
this Kafkaesque predicament. At several levels, various 
groups on various continents are calling for more trans-
parency as far as predictive modelling is concerned. Not 
only academic circles and privacy activists (EPIC), but 
also computer professionals (ACM, IEEE), standard setting 
bodies, and various governmental bodies and parliaments 
in the EU and the US have issued calls of the kind. Such 
transparency is intended to contribute to restoring account-
ability for computerized systems that assist humans in their 
decision-making.
It is crucial, as far as transparency is concerned, to dis-
tinguish its possible beneficiaries: intermediate oversight 
bodies, or the public at large (cf. de Laat 2018, p. 527). 
Accordingly, transparency can be enlarged in steps, each 
step enlarging the circle of those in the know. The first 
option to consider is installing oversight bodies. Think of 
governmental agencies, or external bodies of experts. It is 
their task to certify that professional standards of accuracy, 
fairness, robustness and the like are adhered to all along. 
Two varieties of such oversight can be distinguished. With 
white-box transparency, experts obtain full insight into the 
datasets used, the process of modelling and its algorithmic 
outcome, and how the final model is used. With black-box 
transparency the same applies, except that the algorithm in 
use remains opaque and can only be tested from outside the 
organization.
What does this auditing bring to us ordinary citizens? 
At least we may be ensured that the modelling that pertains 
to us is adequate and up to professional standards. We may 
still be in the dark as to what led to a decision, the fog from 
Kafka’s ‘Der Prozeß’ persists, but at least we have a consola-
tion in its non-arbitrariness.
The most promising option would be, of course, if trans-
parency to the public at large could be achieved. While dis-
closing the very datasets used in modelling would not seem a 
good idea (in view of privacy considerations), having out in 
the open the models in use and how they are applied to con-
crete cases would be a good idea from the point of view of 
ordinary citizens who demand to be informed of the reasons 
for algorithmically-inspired decisions. At long last we would 
be able to see the reasoning behind predictions that affect us.
These hopes for an understanding of the algorithms may, 
however, turn out to be just a fata morgana. More often than 
not, ML models are intrinsically opaque (what follows is 
excerpted from de Laat 2018, para. 7). While simple classifi-
ers are interpretable, modern classifiers use multiple trees in 
their construction, hundreds of them. Outcomes thus can no 
longer be interpreted easily. Furthermore, neural networks 
have always been inscrutable—by design. The main trend 
in ML is towards greater efficiency of outcomes; interpret-
ability is relegated to the background.
Only in the rare case that a model is interpretable and 
can be ‘read’ easily (like a one-sided decision tree or a score 
card), would we be able to glimpse the main factors that 
count. As a corollary, subjects would be able to know why 
an organization affected them through a particular decision. 
But at the same time, paradoxically, options for resistance 
are opening up. The system can be ‘gamed’: detect the prox-
ies involved and try henceforth to evade them. The feasibility 
of this, though, depends on the type of proxies involved (the 
following section about proxies is based on de Laat 2018, 
para. 5).
When proxies refer to specific behaviours, evasion seems 
obvious. A tax evader learns from profiles for tax evasion 
that high donations to charity are a red flag; in future he/she 
cancels these donations. In the search for a loan one discov-
ers that using a credit card is a bad omen; so one no longer 
uses it. Potential terrorists learn that wearing a Palestinian 
scarf sends a clear signal; so they learn to avoid the scarf. 
Less obviously, they may learn that paying in cash, and for 
a one-way plane ticket at that, is considered suspicious; so 
they obtain a ticket in another way. However, when the prox-
ies refer to personal characteristics, evasion becomes harder. 
Being an accountant turns out to arouse suspicions of evad-
ing taxes; being a Muslim of Middle-Eastern appearance 
cannot but arouse fears of terrorist intentions. Such charac-
teristics can hardly be evaded (or only at a price).
Unsurprisingly, private organizations, and in their wake, 
public organizations, are dead set against such total transpar-
ency. The prediction models in use are considered to be their 
intellectual property. The models give a competitive advan-
tage that they are not prepared to give up easily. So they 
guard their algorithms as a trade secret, embed watermarks 
in them to prevent theft, or apply for patents on the under-
lying methods (which strengthens protection even more). 
Moreover, as far as interpretable ML models are involved, 
the prospect of subjects gaming their models would neces-
sitate additional modelling efforts. Either the models have 
to be made more robust against gaming, or the gameable 
proxies have to be omitted from the modelling (which might 
well delete valuable information).
So, for the near future, limited transparency—for over-
sight bodies only—seems to be the only feasible option. 
Such a development would only mildly soften our Kaf-
kaesque predicament. We can be sure that the predictions 
that concern us are up to the professional standards of mod-
ern ML; their accuracy, fairness, and the like are beyond 
doubt. In some contexts you will turn out to be a suspect—
time to ponder if you already are one after all?
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Conclusions
In many contexts, predictive practices based on ML amount 
to disciplining. Norms are to be respected; a prediction that 
deviance is around the corner, is enough to trigger close 
attention, restrictions, or even sanctions. Governance by 
disciplining has definitely not given way to governance by 
group risk. In reaching this conclusion it has been shown 
that tools from the Foucauldian toolbox can still usefully be 
deployed for an analysis of present day surveillance. Notice, 
though, that Foucauldian discipline is specific and focused 
on the body—while predictive discipline is more diffuse and 
focused on the mind.
For those subjected to predictive disciplining, transpar-
ency of the algorithmic process to oversight bodies would 
seem the maximally attainable option in the near future. We 
may rest assured that the discipline affecting us conforms to 
the best practices of the ML community. In rather utopian 
fashion, though, I can imagine two alternative future sce-
narios that would give some relief from Kafkaesque gloom.
First, recently, trimmed-down varieties have been sug-
gested of full transparency to the public at large. The reason-
ing behind a decision about a particular data subject can be 
derived and communicated to him/her upon request (“sub-
ject-centric explanations”; cf. algo:aware 2018, p. 25). Some 
examples are readily mentioned. A sensitivity analysis (aka 
counterfactual explanations) is intended to answer the ques-
tion of how much a focal subject’s input data have to change 
in order to change the outcome. The quantitative input influ-
ence approach measures the influence of various inputs on 
decisional outcomes for a particular data subject. In quite 
another approach, new models that are easily interpretable 
are learned locally, in an area around the focal subject; they 
mimic the local behaviour of the full model (a technique 
called LIME). Such local transparency, of whatever flavour, 
may have more chances to be realized in practice than full 
transparency, since these solutions do not require the full 
algorithm to be disclosed to anyone. Therefore, the objec-
tions against disclosing intellectual property and/or of creat-
ing an invitation to game the system carry less weight.
Secondly, in a broader time frame we may draw cour-
age from a movement in ML that brings the interpretability 
of models into the foreground. In particular, only causal 
variables are to be entered into the modelling. Especially for 
medical contexts they argue that uninterpretable models are 
simply no longer acceptable, neither to medical personnel 
nor to patients. The challenge is, whether accuracy of model-
ling can be salvaged all along. If this demand ever reaches 
the disciplinary contexts discussed above, it would mean 
that those in authority can no longer hide behind opacity and 
remain silent. Instead, they are held to account and forced to 
open up their models to the public and provide reasons for 
decisions upon request. Obviously, complications related to 
gaming the system would have to be sorted out.
As a final reflection, we may take an even bigger step 
forward (or backwards?) and argue that this predictive dis-
ciplining before-the-deed should be rejected altogether. It is 
this conclusion that Matzner draws from his investigations of 
the subjectivities created by predictive techniques. However 
useful it may be to open up the black boxes of algorithms in 
use, we should, he argues, move beyond the issue of trans-
parency and ask ourselves whether we want them to ‘deter-
mine our lives’ at all (Matzner 2017, p. 44).
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